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Recent neuropsychological evidence suggest that a key role in linking perceptions
and intentions is played by sense of presence. Despite this phenomenon having been
studied primarily in the field of virtual reality (conceived as the illusion of being in the
virtual space), recent research highlighted that it is a fundamental feature of everyday
experience. Specifically, the function of presence as a cognitive process is to locate
the Self in a physical space or situation, based on the perceived possibility to act in it;
so, the variations in sense of presence allow one to continuously adapt his own action
to the external environment. Indeed intentions, as the cognitive antecedents of action,
are not static representations of the desired outcomes, but dynamic processes able
to adjust their own representational content according to the opportunities/restrictions
emerging in the environment. Focusing on the peculiar context of action mediated by
interactive technologies, we here propose a theoretical model showing how each level
of an intentional hierarchy (future-directed; present directed; and motor intentions) can
“interlock” with environmental affordances in order to promote a continuous stream of
action and activity.
Keywords: intentions, presence, action, agency, affordance
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Riva et al. (2011, 2015a), Riva and Mantovani (2012), Waterworth and Riva (2014)
proposed that a fundamental role in coupling intentions, perception, and action is played by
sense of presence, conceived as a speciﬁc cognitive process. The concept of sense of presence
emerged around the Nineties in the ﬁeld of interactive technology studies, in particular in Virtual
Reality. Indeed, the ﬁrst studies tried to understand what allowed people to feel present inside
computer-simulated environments.
The so-called Media Presence theories (Loomis, 1992; Sheridan, 1992, 1994; Schloerb, 1995;
Lombard and Ditton, 1997) consider sense of presence as the function of the experience of a
given medium. These theories explain sense of presence on the basis of perception and attention.
For example, according to Lombard and Ditton (1997) sense of presence appears when an
“illusion of non-mediation” establishes, that is, the individual using virtual reality stops to pay
attention to the technology in use (for example, the head mounted display) and focuses on the
content of the virtual environment. On the one hand, these theories are useful to provide virtual
reality design guidelines. On the other hand, these theories fail in explaining why something
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like the sense of presence exists. Why, from an evolutionary
point of view, should we need something like a cognitive process
devoted to generate a sense of “being there” while interacting
with simulation technologies? Media Presence theories do not
provide answers to this question (Lee, 2004; Riva et al.,
2011). The existence of sense of presence highlights that the
perceived location of an individual is not a mere by-product
of the individual actually being in a given place. Indeed,
since the manipulation of environmental features (for example:
digitally rendering a simulated environment via virtual reality)
is able to alter the perceived location of the individual, it
appears that a speciﬁc form of information processing is
devoted to provide such outcome. We can consider critically
the proposal by Lombard and Ditton (1997): if sense of
presence depends on an illusion excluding the virtual reality
technology from our attention, how can we feel a sense of
presence in physical reality, where no technological mediations
exist?
In contrast, Inner Presence theories (Zahorik and Jenison,
1998; Moore et al., 2002; Lee, 2004; Riva et al., 2011, 2015b;
Riva and Waterworth, 2014) consider sense of presence as
a fundamental component of our cognition, which plays a
precise role in our everyday life and is not necessarily related
to the fruition of interactive media. Riva et al. (2011, 2015b)
proposed a complex model that describes sense of presence
as a neuropsychological phenomenon whose central goal is
the control of agency and activity, through the unconscious
separation of “internal” and “external”. In other words, the
experience of presence can be described as the outcome of
an intuitive meta-cognitive process that allows us to control
our actions through the comparison between intentions and
perceptions (Riva and Mantovani, 2012). Following this view,
presence is a core neuropsychological phenomenon whose goal
is to produce a sense of agency and control: I am present
in a real or virtual space if I manage to put my intentions
into action (enacting them). Feeling variations in the sense of
presence, one can monitor his own actions and tune his activity
accordingly.
According to this theory, the link between sense of presence
and the enacting of intentions is strong and fundamental. If
we consider again the ﬁeld of virtual reality and new media,
indeed, technical aspects of the virtual environments (such as, for
example, pictorial realism or intensity of the sensory stimulation)
have a weak impact on the sensation of “being there” if compared
with the impression of being able to enact intentions. For
example, a video game player can feel strongly present while
playing a product with very simple graphics and basic animations.
This could happen in that the game features:
(1) an usable and easy-to-master interface which is adequate to
the player’s capable movements.
(2) an easily understandable game structure (possible directions
to take, objectives, game rules, etc.) which eﬃciently relates
to the here-and-now desired outcomes for the player.
(3) a compelling, engaging and interesting storyline, which
provides the player with long-term goals and ultimate
objectives.
Indeed, numerous experiments demonstrated that self-
reported sense of presence in virtual environments is strongly
related to the usability and eﬀectiveness of interactive features
(Coelho et al., 2006) and to narration/storyline contents (Gorini
et al., 2011; Triberti et al., 2014). According to Inner Presence
theories, this aspects inﬂuence sense of presence also in
everyday life. One can feel more or less present in a given
situation depending on how much he has the impression of
being able to enact his own intentions, recognizing and using
environmental opportunities for action, and then monitoring the
perceived action outcomes as more or less consistent with the
representational content of intentions. But how does this happen?
What does it mean to “feel present” in everyday life? How does
exactly sense of presence relates to one’s own Self?
According to Riva et al. (2011, 2015b), Waterworth and
Riva (2014) sense of presence is a unitary feeling, but on
the process side it can be divided into three phylogenetically
diﬀerent layers/subprocesses. On the side of Self, these layers
are symmetrical to the layers of Self as described by Damasio
(2011). According to him, the conscious Self is built, as a ﬁrst
step, on a collection of “primordial feelings” constituted by
enteroceptive, proprioceptive and motor information coming
from the body (proto-Self), which allow the organism to
distinguish itself from the external environment. At the second
level, core-Self is related to the perceptual diﬀerentiation
between the Self and the recognized external object. Finally,
the Autobiographical Self is related to the emergence of
consciousness and symbolic/categorical knowledge: thanks
to the use of language, we become able to represent the
events in our personal story and, as a consequence, also
to formulate abstract action plans oriented to the distant
future. According to this layered conception of the Self, sense
of presence can be represented as composed by three sub-
processes. Proto-presence is the process of internal/external
separation related to proprioception and motor control,
since its object is the basic distinction between Self and
non-Self, still without diﬀerentiating the characteristics of
the external object(s). Basically, a sense of proto-presence
allow us to monitor whether motor intentions are being
correctly enacted by our own body, regardless of the external
environment. Diﬀerently, Core presence is related to the
sensorial experience of the environment. At this layer, the
agent starts interacting with the objects. The “external” is
speciﬁed at the level of aﬀordances for actions, so, the agent
monitor his own intentions as having or not the expected
eﬀects on the external environment which is around him at
the present moment. Finally, Extended presence is to verify
the signiﬁcance to the Self of experienced events in the
external world. The more the Self is present in signiﬁcant
experiences, the more it will be able to reach its goals,
increasing the possibility of surviving. Extended presence
requires intellectually and/or emotionally signiﬁcant content.
In other words, feeling extended presence means monitoring
the enacting of abstract/general objectives into complex
action plans. Figure 1 shows how the three layers of presence
relate to the Self as explained by Damasio (2011), and how
intention enacting generates sense of presence through the
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FIGURE 1 | Layers of presence and layers of Self, and a representation of the feeling of presence emerging from intention enacting and action
monitoring (adapted from Waterworth and Riva, 2014).
confrontation between action and the ﬁnal state of the external
environment.
The theory of sense of presence highlights that we
continuously monitor our own activity (in the form of
intention enacting) in our own body, and in the external
world. In this sense, intentions should be able to “interlock”
with the opportunities for action coming from the environment,
both at the level of the current situation and at the level of
the extended, conceptual possibilities. On the one hand, this
relates to activity monitoring when the action is initiated.
For example, recent hypotheses coming from Neuroscience
(Numan, 2015) sustain that the hippocampus and the prefrontal
cortex play a critical role in the enacting of action plans and
the formation of episodic, autonoetic memories; speciﬁcally,
the prefrontal cortex is responsible for elaboration of goal-
directed behavior and transmission of an eﬀerence copy of
the action (or “corollary discharge”) to the hippocampus,
which serves as an intention-outcome comparator. Finally,
the response of the hippocampal comparator returns to
the prefrontal cortex where it is used to strengthen the
current action plan (in case of success) or to reformulate
it (in case of intention-outcome mismatch), this way
fostering memory updating. On the other hand, in the
present contribution we will try to show how a comparison
between intentions and the external world happens even
before the action. The “interlocking” metaphor highlights that,
as we will deepen in the next section, intentions should
be conceived as layered structures themselves. Indeed,
in order to an intention being enacted, any layer of an
intentional structure (distal-conceptual; proximal-present;
motor-micropresent) should ﬁnd its own correspondence
in the external world, in terms of feasible aﬀordances. In
this sense, “monitoring our own activity” does not mean to
control for the consequences of actions only, but also, and
more importantly, to perceive and recognize the aﬀordances
for action relying in the external environment before the
action onset. How does this process actually happen? In
order to explain this, we will deepen the concept of intention
itself, showing how also intentions can be represented as
hierarchies/layered structures; then, we will introduce a
theoretical model about the interlocking between intentions and
environmental aﬀordances at the diﬀerent levels of information
processing.
INTENTIONS
Numerous philosophical conceptions, as well as common sense,
posit that intentions guide actions. Classic experiments and
theories challenged this apparently simple assumption, in that
they have shown that neural activation related to the initiation of
movement (readiness potential) seemed to appear independently
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of conscious awareness (Libet, 1999, 2010). For this reason,
according to Libet (1999, 2010) and other researchers (Wegner,
2002), intentions may not be the causal antecedents of action, but
an illusion generated by the consciousness after the action onset.
The paradox highlighted by Libet’s (1999, 2010) work can
be resolved when considering a more sophisticated conception
of intentions (Gallagher, 2006; Pacherie and Haggard, 2010).
Indeed, intentions are not onlymotor representations guiding the
motor components of an action and appearing just immediately
before the movement itself, so that they can be fully associated
with the readiness potential. On the contrary, they may develop
at larger time scales (potentially, including almost a lifetime
between the generation of the intention and its achievement)
in that they entail conscious deliberative decisions, abstract,
and descriptive representations, and “mental time travel” as a
cognitive adaptation allowing humans to simulate contingencies
and consequences of future actions (Suddendorf and Corballis,
2007; Eren, 2009; Corballis, 2013).
Recently, Pacherie (2006, 2008), Pacherie and Haggard (2010)
introduced a dynamic theory of intentions which distinguishes
among Distal Intentions, Proximal Intentions and Motor
Intentions.
- Distal Intentions develop at potentially large time scales and
represent abstract reasoning about means and plans (e.g.,: “I
want to become a psychologist”)
- Proximal Intentions constitute the conscious antecedents of a
given action, developing at the level of the present time (e.g.,:
“Now I will write a psychology essay to pass my university
exam”)
- Motor Intentions develop at a micro-present level and guide
themotor components of the action (i.e., how the action should
be physically performed); they are mostly unconscious (e.g.,:
“I’m moving my hands on the keyboard this way to write”).
As Pacherie (2008) says, the three layers of intentions do
not simply coexist, but they form an “intentional cascade” with
Distal Intentions generating Proximal Intentions, and Proximal
Intentions generating Motor Intentions. However, it is not fully
clear how can the diﬀerent layers of intentions relate to the
external world. Indeed, Motor Intentions are strictly dependent
on the physical environment where the movement is about
to take place; for example, the motor intention “moving my
hands on the keyboard this way to write” should “take into
consideration” distance between the body and the computer, the
position of the keys on the keyboard, as well as the strength to use
with the ﬁngers in order to correctly activate the keys.
Similarly, the intention “now I will write an essay”, as a
proximal intention, has to “anchor the action plan in the current
situation” (Pacherie, 2008, p. 188). Enacting a proximal intention
means identifying the environmental aﬀordances which permit
the activation of the behavior. For example, the computer having
a precise set of functions which allows one to write, cite and save
his own work. In other words, at the level of proximal intentions,
an agent should perceive and identify the opportunities for action
existing within the environment. This happens not only at the
mere motor level, but also identifying the functions of tools, the
limits imposed by obstacles, the possibility to move or not to a
diﬀerent environment, and so on.
From the point of view of intention enacting, the Distal
Intention (“I want to become a psychologist”) is the most elusive.
Pacherie (2008, p. 188) sustains that distal intentions provide
proximal intentions with an action plan that “may be still mostly
descriptive and abstract”. Indeed, they are not directly related to
the context of action (one may intend to become a psychologist
independently of what is happening around him at the present
moment). But how do distal intentions relate to the external
world?
Castelfranchi (2014, p. 107), who is interested in showing
that intentions are a speciﬁc kind of goals, deﬁne intentions
as “those goals that actually drive our voluntary actions or are
ready/prepared to drive them”. Also he focuses on trying to
understand how abstract intentions can guide actions. He argues
that abstract intentions need to be converted in “concrete cues”,
so that it becomes possible for the agent to control whether they
have been achieved or not. For example, a distal and abstract
intention such as “I want to take revenge for the oﬀense” should
be situated in a precise situation (or multiple situations) in which
precise actions (insulting, manipulating, dueling) take place.
Doing so, an agent can eﬀectively control his own intentions
and agency. However, the concept of “concrete cues” appears as
somewhat elusive. What are “concrete cues” exactly? On the one
hand, they are probably eﬀects and micro-eﬀects of the action,
that the agent compare with the representational content of the
intention to monitor whether the action is being performed as
desired/expected, as it is argued by the Comparator Models of
agency (Pacherie, 2008; Carruthers, 2012; Chambon et al., 2014;
Numan, 2015). However, this kind of “concrete cues” (i.e., those
coming from the detection of action consequences) seem not
suﬃcient to us as explanation of intentions. In the next section,
we will introduce a theoretical model about the “interlocking”
between intentions and environmental aﬀordances, in order to
show how intentions can relate to the external world even
in absence of “concrete cues” conceived as consequences of
performed action.
INTRODUCING A MODEL ABOUT THE
HIERARCHICAL INTERLOCKING OF
ENACTED INTENTIONS
We argue that an agent should not “control” an intention just
at the time the intention is already in the form of its physical
enaction. In other words, and agent should know whether a
given intention can be enacted or not, already at the time
when the intention is distant-future directed, abstract and merely
descriptive, still not speciﬁed into physical actions and micro-
movements at the motor level. Speciﬁcally, the agent should
know whether his own intentions satisfy or not criteria diﬀerent
from the ones the agent himself uses to monitor eﬀectiveness
of physical action. At each level of the intentional hierarchy,
intentions are the object of a cognitive/intuitive evaluation which
authorizes them to proceed down the cascade until the initiation
and the monitoring of behavior. But what are the concrete
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cues at the level of abstraction? How can we know whether a
given cognitive process promoting behavior deserves the status
of “intention” (e.g., goal guiding action or ready/prepared to
guide it)? This kind of concrete cues allow the formation
of an intention since they consist of information attesting
intention’s “enactability” in the external world. As Laurent
(2003) observes, mental representations (and also intentions)
do not represent the state of the external world, but the
state of one’s own engagement in the world. This means that
intentions have to reﬂect the opportunities for enacting an action,
this way becoming “simulated aﬀordances” that illustrate what
reality aﬀords to enact behavior, at any level of information
processing.
Indeed, each level of the intentional hierarchy is characterized
by an external world-dependent requisite to be satisﬁed, in order
to continue to guide action. So, we sustain that a given intentional
hierarchy has to “interlock” with the external world, already at the
time when the ﬁrst movement(s) of the corresponding action are
still not initiated.
- The motor intention is the intention that directly informs the
movement. For this reason, it has to interlock with physical
objects and properties which make possible, totally, or in
part, the actual performance. Spatial and temporal limitations
belong to this category, such as physical properties of objects
that make them more or less adequate to the morphological
structure of the agent. The condition for a cognitive process
becoming a motor intention is having a representational
content which is directly tangible/manipulable.
- The proximal intention consists in the product of the distal
intention, as a general goal that is transformed into action
plan(s). The proximal intention interlocks with environmental
aﬀordances, conceived as opportunities for action: it has to
identify sets of functions, rules and provisions, in the form of
possible courses of actions. For example, the intention “writing
now an essay” requires the agent being able to recognize
the environmental features which make possible the intention
enacting, such as having the computer, turning it on and being
able to write through the keyboard. To sum up, the condition
for a cognitive process becoming a proximal intention is having
a representational content which is perceivable as a concrete
opportunity for action in the external world.
- The Distal Intention (“I want to become a psychologist”; “I
want to take revenge of the oﬀense”; “I want to win the
gold medal”) interlocks with socio-cultural conditions which
maintain a relationship of resemblance with the “possible
world” imagined by the agent, that is, those contents of
his imagination featuring emotional and identity values. For
example: “I want to become a psychologist” is not an abstract
claim; it actually develops in a socio-cultural context where (1)
some desirable outcomes for the agent (e.g.,: understanding
people; studying behavior; treating psychopathologies) are
incarnated in the “psychologist” ﬁgure, and (2) that socio-
cultural context features a number of possible courses of
action one could take to actually become a psychologist. The
condition for a cognitive process becoming a distal intention is
to have a representational content which is thinkable, basing on
the characteristics of the socio-cultural context in the external
world.
Intentions (from the motor level to the more abstract
one) are already interlocked with the world even before they
are transformed into actions, because they are fundamentally
predictive. The human mind has the capacity to generate
probabilistic models about the future, basing on the analysis
of sensory inputs. According to the so-called “free energy”
framework (Friston et al., 2006; Friston, 2009, 2010; Fotopoulou,
2014), the fundamental function of our brain is to reduce the
inconsistency between predictions about the world and the world
as it is actually perceived, or, monitoring the divergence between
our motivations/needs and the “state of the coupling between
the individual and his environment” (Laurent, 2003, p. 387).
This inconsistency/divergence is the free energy, which has to be
maintained at the lowest possible level to avoid surprise (Clark,
2013). The brain continuously generates prediction models based
on noisy sensory inputs to represent future states of the body and
the external world.
In our view, intentions work as prediction models with
associated motivational value. Also a distal and abstract intention
(“I want to become a psychologist”) is constructed and sharpened
over time to match incoming external/sensory inputs. This
process entails two main sub-level processes related to one’s
own activity monitoring. The ﬁrst entails the identiﬁcation
of aﬀordances and opportunities for action (even in abstract
terms) to understand whether and how the intention can be
progressively accompanied to become an action. The second
process consists in its progressive transformation in a more-and-
more practical, concrete, and motor guide for action. In other
words, the second process is the generation of the intentional
cascade.
Let us consider an example. One person feels a motivational
drive to study human behavior and to treat psychopathologies.
For some reason, this has a positive emotional value for him
and he considers these tasks as consistent with his own identity.
So, he decides he wants to be a psychologist. This distal,
abstract intention is not dependent on the here-and-now context.
However, it does not start to guide behavior, nor it starts an
intentional cascade, “out of nowhere”. The agent has to control
whether or not there are, in his perception of the world, general
opportunities to reach his own purpose: going to the university,
following courses, augmenting his own knowledge, obtaining a
psychology degree which would be accepted and recognized by
the society he lives in. The distal intention has to match with
thinkable opportunities in the world, this way starting to reduce
the inconsistency between the representational content of the
intention (“I want to become a psychologist”) and the current
reality of the thinkable and perceivable world (“I am currently
not a psychologist”).
Of course, at this level the free energy resulting from the
inconsistency between the volitional representation and the
actual state of the world is very high; moreover, it is probably
impossible to represent it, because both the intention and
the desired state exist just in abstract, imaginative terms. For
this reason, while general opportunities for actions start to
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FIGURE 2 | The Model of Hierarchical Interlocking of Enacted
Intentions, which is intended to show how any level of an intentional
structure relates to a precise level of environmental affordances.
appear and to match with the intention, the intention itself
has to be speciﬁed in here-and-now guides for action to adapt
to more-and-more situated environmental aﬀordances. This is
“when” proximal intentions are generated, and have to be
matched with the concrete opportunities for action existing
in the current situation. Then, while proximal aﬀordances are
approached, motor aﬀordances may appear informing how the
physical movement should be performed. At this moment, the
action can be initiated transforming proximal intentions in
the best set of motor intentions for the situation. Doing this,
the agent progressively fulﬁll his own distal intention and the
entire intentional cascade, this way reducing the free energy
resulting from the confrontation between the desired state (the
representational content of the intention) and the actual state of
the world.
Figure 2 shows a theoretical model we originally proposed
in the ﬁeld of technology and human computer interaction
(Triberti et al., n.d.; Triberti and Riva, 2015), originally labeled
“Perfect Interaction Model” because it virtually represented the
interaction in which every intentional level of the user perfectly-
interlocks with the characteristics of a technology. Here, we
present it as representing general intentional agency. In other
words, the model represents the Hierarchical Interlocking of
Enacted Intentions.
The model has six levels, three representing the human agent
part (distal intention, proximal intention, motor intention) and
the other three representing the world part (distal aﬀordances,
proximal aﬀordances, motor aﬀordances). The three arrows show
how every intentional level interlocks with a precise level of the
world’s opportunities for action.
Considering our example: the ﬁrst arrow relates to the agent
who wants to become a psychologist. He starts his own action
plan in that the world actually presents the possibility to become
a psychologist, containing possible courses of actions and cultural
representations associated with this ﬁgure (distal aﬀordances).
Using Laurent’s (2003) terminology, the representational content
of the distal intention resembles a “simulated aﬀordance” in that
it regards thinkable opportunities in the world to be achieved.
The second arrow relates to the here-and-now intention to write
an essay; it interlocks with the proximal aﬀordances given by
the set or “structure” (Garrett, 2010) of functions guaranteed
by the computer the agent decides to use (a technology that
allows one to write, cite, and save his own work); ﬁnally, arrow 3
represents the interlocking between the motor aﬀordances of the
computer (that is, the interface, or the physical representation of
the structure of functions) and the motor intentions representing
the movements to be performed (moving ﬁngers this way to write
a given letter).
In the ﬁeld of Human Computer Interaction and User
Experience, the present model is useful to identify the source
of interaction failures at the level of intentional representation
and/or technological features (Triberti et al., n.d.; Triberti and
Riva, 2015) (for example: does the user ignore what to do, and
so he doesn’t know how to structure action plans of use, or is the
technology that doesn’t communicate well its own functions?).
In this context, we argue that such a model may be useful to
show how intentions relates to the external world already at the
time when they are not transformed into physical action, through
a process of continuous confrontation between representational
content and the opportunities in the external world, devoted to
progressive reduction of free energy.
As a conclusion, in accordance with both the theory of
Intentions by Pacherie (2008) and the theory of Self by
Damasio (2011), the presence theory from which we have
started highlights that our own actions and intentions are
enacted at a three-levels complexity; as motor behavior, based
on proprioceptive information coming from our own bodies and
their interaction with the physical properties of external objects;
as proximal/contextual behavior, based on the perception of
environmental functions and aﬀordances; and as future behavior,
based on the preﬁguring/simulation of action plans. In this
sense, any intentional hierarchy layer has to interlock with the
respective environmental aﬀordances, being them ready-to-hand
physical properties (motor intentions), tools/obstacles actually
present in the here-and-now environment (proximal intentions),
or conceptualized action plans that are part of the society’s
cultural background (distal-abstract intentions). The highest the
success of the interlocking process at any level, the highest is
the sense of being present in a situation, as the result of the
impression of being able to transform intentions into actions and
controlling one’s own agency in the world.
This contribution expands on the previous literature on the
topic in two ways: on the one hand, it constitutes the ﬁrst
attempt to link the theory of presence to a modeling of intention
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enacting; on the other hand, it deepens the concept of intention
highlighting its relationship with the world prior to its enacting.
Indeed, the described process happens on the background of
sense of presence, that is, the sensation to be in a given situation
emerging from the impression to be able to enact intentions.
Sense of presence is not an automatic outcome of the “simple fact”
that one ﬁnd himself in a given place. On the contrary, we “know
where we are” basing on our perceived possibility of being able to
pursue our own objectives in distal, proximal, and motor terms.
Thanks to this fundamental process, we state the basis not
only for the action plans related to the situated agency of motor
behavior, but also of our own distal Self-projecting in future life.
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